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INSURER'S ACCESS TO GENETIC
INFORMATION: THE CALL FOR
COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid developments in science and medicine are constantly creating
new methods of determining an individual's genetic composition, in-
cluding any predisposition to certain diseases. Genetic screening in-
cludes tests that can be used to find sickle-cell trait, a risk of emphy-
sema, a predisposition for chronic bronchitis, an increased risk of lung
cancer, and a tendency towards anemia, among other things.2 However,
as scientists discover these traits, individuals are becoming more con-
cerned about the privacy of their genetic information.3 In response to
the fears of the public, lawmakers are reacting by creating laws to pre-
vent discrimination based on genetic information. Even Vice-President
Gore has been quoted as saying, "Genetic progress should not become a
new excuse for discrimination.,
4
One of the many debates surrounding genetic information is that in-
surance companies are charging certain applicants or insureds increased
premiums or denying them benefits because these individuals are at a
higher risk of developing a certain disease.' In response to attacks on
insurance companies, the president of the California Health Care Insti-
tute framed the concern of insurers throughout the United States: "Our
fears.., are producing a spate of ill-advised laws that will have serious
unintended consequences in the private insurance industry."6  The
Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) is also troubled by
1. See Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205,206 n.2 (1996).
2. See ELAINE DRAPER, RISKY BUSINESS 11 (1991).
3. See Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Florida in the
Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protection from Private and
Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25 (1997).
4. Reuters, Genes and Discrimination: Gore Urges Laws Banning Bias in Hiring and
Insurance, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21,1998, at A20.
5. See Karen Ann Jensen, Comment, Genetic Privacy in Washington State: Policy Con-
siderations and a Model Genetic Privacy Ac4 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 357,368 (1997).
6. David Gollaher, All Can Use Gene Tests... Except Poor Screening Helps Insurers and
(Surprise) Patients with Risks and Money, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 11, 1998, at
El.
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state restrictions on insurers' ability to collect information for risk as-
sessment and selection.7 Essentially, concern is surfacing about the lack
of uniformity in "patchwork" state legislation designed to prevent ge-
netic discrimination in health insurance! The hasty laws being created
across the country are also causing concern in the scientific community.
One industry representative has stated:
The sponsors of these bills are well intentioned, [b]ut often they
don't understand the science or the potential consequences of
their bills. Some of the legislation would virtually stop genetic
research or severely limit our ability to conduct clinical trials.
There should be Federal standards on medical and genetic pri-
vacy.9
However, as concern about genetic information increases, more states
are developing laws to protect individuals.
This Comment examines the various methods of regulating genetic
information in order to protect individual privacy. The inherently slow
nature of the federal legislative process has spawned legislation by sev-
eral states, and this Comment will expose the pitfalls of such hasty deci-
sion making. Part II provides a brief history of genetic research and a
basic foundation of insurance principles. It then establishes a frame-
work for state and federal legislation by evaluating the collision of the
individual's demand for privacy and the insurer's demand for informa-
tion. Part III examines the differences in numerous state law definitions
and prohibitions. Part IV discusses the failed attempts by the federal
government to introduce a genetic privacy law. Finally, Part V ad-
dresses the need for a comprehensive federal law and proposes a solu-
tion that is both favorable to insurers and individual privacy interests.
Even though individuals should not be denied the right to privacy in ge-
netic information, total privacy will eventually drive the business of in-
surance out of states without the ability to distinguish among applicants.
7. See Robert Pear, States Pass Laws to Regulate Use of Genetic Testing, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 18, 1997, at Al.
8. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, the Genetic "Quick Fix," and the Jewish
Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97,109 (1997).
9. Pear, supra note 7, quoting Carl B. Feldbaum, the president of the Biotechnology In-
dustry Organization, which represents 730 genetic testing companies.
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II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENETIC INFORMATION AND
INSURANCE
A. Understanding Genetic Information
The recent surge of concern related to genetic information may be a
result of the Human Genome Project. This project is a federally funded
biotechnology research program expected to last fifteen years and cost
three billion dollars.'0 The project is designed to map out the human ge-
nome in hopes of creating widely available diagnostic tests and cures for
diseases that are caused by genetic defects." Overall, the project is ex-
pected to map three billion pairs of genome.'2 Francis Collins, director
of the Human Genome Project ("HGP") believes that, "[i]n the next
five to ten years, there will be tens if not hundreds of genetic-
predisposition tests available."' 3
Interestingly, concern over genetic privacy is not always well-
founded because the tests used are not completely accurate. 4 However,
over time, the HGP promises a decrease "in vulnerability to disease,
disability, and premature death."'" Along with early diagnosis, the HGP
brings hope for a new ability to diagnose and treat diseases. 6 However,
the tests are not yet able to predict the date that the actual disease will
manifest itself, the severity of the symptoms after manifestation, or the
efficacy of treatment. 7 For example, the uncertainty of genetic tests is
displayed by the fact that scientists are still unable to determine the
probability of developing breast or ovarian cancer in a woman with the
altered BRCA1 gene, a well researched and documented gene.
Genetic discrimination is based on an apparent genetic variation
10. See Berry, supra note 1, at 206.
11. See id.
12. See Robert Gatter, Health Law Lecture on Law and Policy Concerning Genetic
Testing, Privacy, and Discrimination (Apr. 23,1996).
13. Susan Page, White House Wants to Ban Gene Bias in Workplace, USA TODAY, Jan.
20,1998, at Al.
14. See Draper, supra note 2, for a more complete explanation of genetic testing and
genetics in general beginning with the use of genetic screening for employment purposes con-
cerning hazardous substances.
15. Berry, supra note 1, at 233.
16. See id. at 207.
17. See Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic
and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 114 (1991). Fu-
ture advances will further define the impact of discrimination. Eventually, genetic diagnosis
and prognosis will be more accurate and less expensive. See id. at 113.
18. See Rothenberg, supra note 8.
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from normal.'9 Amidst all the controversy regarding genetic discrimina-
tion lies a debate within the scientific community about the exploration
of genetic information."' For example, individuals may lose the desire to
take care of their bodies and live a healthy life if their future is geneti-
cally inescapable.2 However, even if the scientific community claims to
be concerned about discovering too much, the federal government has
expended three billion dollars, and it is unlikely that research will be
halted."
B. Genetic Information Within the Insurance Industry
The foundational premise of insurance is that of distributing risk;
that is, to distribute the cost of injury or loss among individuals or en-
terprises.23 Therefore, classifying risk is a fundamental step in the opera-
tion of insurance.24 When entry into and operations within the market
are restricted by regulations, insurance prices may not adequately reflect
risk costs, resulting in low-risk people being charged increased premi-
ums?6 For example, when the government prohibits insurers from using
genetic information in underwriting, the insurance company must in-
crease premiums across the board to compensate for those individuals
who are predisposed to certain catastrophic diseases.'
Genetic information will change the face of insurance with or with-
out laws to guard it. Too much information may destroy the central
function of insurance-spreading risk-because there is no risk if an in-
dividual knows his or her future to some degree of reasonable cer-
19. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50
AM. J. HUM. GENET. 476 (1992). Within the broad category of genetic discrimination lie
three distinct types of discrimination: (1) against healthy individuals who merely carry the
gene; (2) against individuals carrying a certain gene that is misunderstood; or (3) against indi-
viduals who are healthy and at risk, but not yet tested. See id
20. See THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW (Ruth Chadwick et al.
eds., 1997).
21. See Rothenberg, supra note 8, at 103.
22. See Berry, supra note 1, at 206. The HGP is expected to last fifteen years. See id
23. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 1 (1986). Insurance is not the
only mechanism of managing risk. Individuals may distribute risk by diversifying investments
or spending money on safety, among other things. See iL at 2.
24. See icL at 64. Abraham provides a thorough explanation of how insurance works and
how it works best. See id. at 64-100.
25. See id at 13.
26. See Berry, supra note 1, at 218-22 for a thorough description of insurance operations
including underwriting and actuarial determinations. However, be aware that Berry proposes
that genetic testing will provide the "proper end of insurance." Id at 256.
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tainty?2' Rationally, it is logical for insurers to discriminate based on ge-
netic information just as they discriminate based on other personal in-
formation, such as age, sex, and smoking?
The fear of unfair discrimination by insurers, however, arises with
genetic testing.2 While as a profit-making business, an insurance com-
pany has an interest in genetic information when charging premiums or
developing coverage, that interest in the information is only relative to
an individual's interest in confidentiality. 30 Professor Richard Epstein
contends that "full benefits of... predictive power of genetic data will
be reaped only if unrestricted access is provided... ,,3' Furthermore,
Judge Richard Posner emphasizes the necessity for open disclosure of
personal information because "data privacy primarily serves to allow in-
dividuals to carry out dishonest manipulations .... 32
The scientific community is also concerned that "[s]etting legal re-
strictions on access to genetic information will... permit the advances
of science to be 'frittered away.', 33 One method being pursued by the
medical and scientific community is anonymous testing, similar to HIV
testing, for specific diseases that are largely untreatable.!4 The problem,
however, is that anonymity cannot coincide with third-party payment.
For example, even the cost of a test for determining a genetic alteration
27. See Berry, supra note 1, at 209.
28. See Jensen, supra note 5, at 368.
29. See E. Virginia Lapham et al., Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers,
SCIENCE, Oct. 25, 1996, at 621 concerning the various statistics of denial and questioning by
insurers. See also Richard A. Bornstein, Note, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Leg-
islation: A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 551, 552 (1996).
People at risk for genetic discrimination include individuals who carry a gene that
increases the probability that they will develop a disease but who are currently
asymptomatic; individuals who are carriers for certain genetic conditions but who
will remain asymptomatic; individuals who have genetic polymorphisms that are not
known to cause disease; and relatives of individuals with known or presumed genetic
characteristics.
Id.
30. See THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW, supra note 20, at 16-17.
31. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
32. Id at 4.
33. Id at 10. Schwartz's article generally discusses privacy and the harms of open infor-
mation.
34. See Maxwell J. Mehlman et al., The Need for Anonymous Genetic Counseling and
Testing, 58 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 393,395 (1996).
35. See id at 396.
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concerning colon cancer (two hundred dollars) is reimbursable.36
While insurers do have an interest in promoting genetic screening,
they generally do not seek genetic information. 3 Typically, insurers of-
fer group policies that are not determined on individual underwriting
standards." In addition, the tests are rarely determinative of what will
happen in the future.39 Arguably, several conditions should be met be-
fore insurers consider using genetic tests to classify risk or discriminate
among insureds: (1) The test should yield additional information not
available elsewhere; (2) the disease should have serious morbid-
ity/mortality rates; (3) the disease should be a common one; (4) the test
must be reliable and predictive; (5) the test must be understood, ac-
cepted, and used; (6) the test should be readily performable; (7) the test
must be affordable and quick; and (8) the test should be risk-free.Y Re-
gardless of whether insurers follow practical guidelines concerning ge-
netic information, several states have decided to regulate the use of ge-
netic information by the insurance industry in order to protect the
privacy of individuals.
III. STATE REGULATION OF GENETIC INFORMATION
A. Concerns of State Legislatures
Scholars have identified three periods of laws regarding genetic
testing. First, laws emerged that prohibited underwriting or rating based
on specifically identified genetic traits.4' Next, states began barring ge-
netic testing altogether from underwriting or rating.42 Finally, laws bar-
ring insurance industry use of genetic information broadened beyond
information collected in laboratory tests.'3 This third phase began with
the passage of a Wisconsin law shortly after the Human Genome Project
36. See Elizabeth Shogren, White House to Seek Genetic Test Safeguards, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 20,1998, at A9.
37. See Billings, supra note 19, at 476.
38. See Berry, supra note 1, at 217. For group underwriting, the insurance company uses
previous claims information. See id.
39. See id. at 234.
40. See Kyle G. Frence, Note, The Elderly and the Discriminatory Use of Genetic Infor-
mation, 5 ELDER L.J. 147, 164 (1997).
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began.' Other states have continued to pass their own laws preventing
genetic discrimination by insurers out of concern that the federal gov-
ernment is acting too slowly.45 Last year alone, legislators saw 153 bills
in various states. Even states that currently have laws prohibiting in-
surers from discriminating based on genetic information are considering
new laws. Ohio, for example, is now concerned that its law does not ad-
dress family histories.' Other states are trying to be proactive and es-
tablish safeguards.' Apparently, the underlying goal in most states is to
encourage the use of genetic tests by individuals by protecting the pri-
vacy of the results.49
The change in laws exhibited in the past five years illustrates the
rapid developments in research. Unfortunately, hasty decision making
by state legislatures creates laws that will long outlive their usefulness,
as some already have. For example, a bill in Florida sought to prohibit
insurers from soliciting information from any other source if that infor-
mation could be obtained through genetic tests. 0  Without knowing
even what genetic tests can reveal, this law could have been potentially
dangerous. Even Wisconsin, the state that passed one of the first ge-
netic testing laws, has considered a new bill in order to keep pace with
scientific progress."
The driving force behind these laws is the fear of unfair discrimina-
tion. However, the term "discrimination" misconstrues the method and
use of genetic information by insurers. Insurance is essentially a system
based on fair "discrimination" and selection. Many of these new laws
restrict an insurer's ability to evaluate risk.52 The spokesman from
HIAA articulated this concern by stating that insurance companies do
not want to require tests, but they need to be able to evaluate medical
44. See Rothenberg, supra note 8, at 108.
45. See Pear, supra note 7.
46. See Gollaher, supra note 6.
47. See Kevin Lamb, Ohio's Genetic Privacy Law, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 3, 1998,
at 3C.
48. See Judy Fahys, Medical Privacy: Strong Protection for Genetic Data Proposed in
Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 26,1997, at Al.
49. See Shogren, supra note 36. Three other approaches are available for protecting ge-
netic information and encouraging testing. In addition to prohibiting the use of information
by insurers and thereby creating genetic privacy, states could (1) use laws that allow use of
information when it is actuarially justified; (2) set fair limits in order to evenly distribute risk
between insurer and insured; or (3) establish laws for community rating. See Berry, supra
note 1, at 237.
50. See H.R. 923,1996 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1996).
51. See A.B. 227, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1995).
52. See Jacobi, supra note 41, at 335.
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history.53 Not only are state laws limiting the function of insurance, they
may be limiting future coverage if a genetic test reveals methods of pos-
sible treatment. The difficulty presented with prohibiting discrimination
lies in the way that these laws define genetic information or genetic
testing, coupled with the specific activities prohibited or restricted.'
B. Variance in Definitions Among States
Most state laws concerning genetic information include definitions
for the various genetic terms. However, several states use unnecessarily
restrictive or unreasonably broad definitions that may lead to problems
when researchers are discovering future uses for genetic testing. There
are several basic terms and methods of definition that states use when
defining significant terms in their legislation, and these methods directly
impact insurers.5
1. Scattered Definitions
Several states have adopted a simple definition of "genetic charac-
teristics" that means "a scientifically or medically identifiable gene or
chromosome, or alteration thereof, that is known to be a cause of a dis-
ease or disorder, or determined to be associated with a statistically in-
creased risk of development of a disease or disorder."56 Although this
definition provides a clear idea of what a genetic characteristic is, it may
not be narrow enough. Definitions similar to this should be restricted to
apply to genes that are only scientifically or medically identifiable. Sev-
eral states use the term "genetic condition." The normal definition is "a
specific chromosomal or single-gene genetic condition." The problem
53. See John Machacek, Slaughter Bill Protects People with Genes Linked to Serious Ill-
ness, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 7,1995.
54. Along with the discrepancies among definitions and prohibitions, each state applies
its laws to a different class of insurer. I will not address the issues surrounding type of insur-
ance. For purposes of this Comment, I am assuming the broad definition of insurer, regard-
less of type of insurance.
55. This Comment will not address those states that have failed to include a definition of
genetic information or genetic characteristic because the implications of this failure stretch far
beyond the scope of this piece. Leaving the decision up to the courts, and therefore subject to
multiple interpretations, is in some aspects much more deficient than beginning with a poor
definition.
56. 1997 Ala. Acts 97-721. See also CAL. INS. CODE § 10147(b) (West Supp. 1998) (In-
cludes phrase: "that is presently not associated with any symptoms of any disease or disor-
der."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (Consol.
1998) (uses the term "genetic predisposition"); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie Supp.
1998); 1997 La. Acts Sess. Law Serv. 1418.
57. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206(5)
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with this definition is that it is circular-it includes the term defined
within the definition.
2. Simple Definition
States have created two different ways of defining "genetic informa-
tion" that are fairly straightforward, yet still problematic. One method
is defining "genetic information" as "information derived from the re-
sults of a genetic test."' While this definition appears concrete, it opens
the door to various definitions of "genetic test" that could end up in-
cluding routine blood work.
The other simple approach is to define genetic information as "in-
formation about genes, gene products, or inherited characteristics that
may derive from an individual or a family member." 9 This definition is
overwhelmingly broad. Technically, the term "inherited characteristics"
could preclude insurers from asking the applicant's eye color or any
other basic feature inherited from a parent. An even more prevalent
display of this flaw is Louisiana's law that provides as follows: "'Genetic
information' means all information about genes, gene products, inher-
ited characteristics, or family history/pedigree that is expressed in com-
mon language."' By including family history, the legislature slammed
the door on any questioning by insurers of applicants about family
medical history or other inherited traits.
3. Exclusions
A few states have taken an extra step to exclude routine tests and
other procedures that may be interpreted to yield genetic information.
Florida and Tennessee have nearly identical statutory provisions that
provide as follows:
"Genetic information" means information derived from genetic
testing to determine the presence or absence of variations or mu-
tations, including carrier status, in an individual's genetic mate-
rial or genes that are scientifically or medically believed to cause
a disease, disorder, or syndrome, or are associated with a statisti-
(c) (1997).
58. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.73(11)(2) (West Supp. 1998); see also NEV. REV. STAT. §
689A.417.3(a) (1998).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie Supp. 1998); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
432:1:10A-118(b) (Michie 1997) (includes any hereditary susceptibility to disease); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215(a)(1) (1998).
60. 1997 La. Acts 1418.
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cally increased risk of developing a disease, disorder, or syn-
drome, which is asymptomatic at the time of testing. Such testing
does not include routine physical examinations or chemical,
blood, or urine analysis, unless conducted purposefully to obtain
genetic information, or questions regarding family history.6'
This definition is probably the most accurate, safe, and comprehen-
sive of all the states. A similar effort was made by North Carolina by
tagging on to the end of its simple statute a clause that eliminates the
"results of routine physical measurements, blood chemistries, blood
counts, urine analyses, tests for abuse of drugs, and tests for [HIV]." 62
While it is admirable that these states are concerned about the inclu-
sion of routine tests, other fears have arisen that should now be included
in any exemptions. Legislatures have addressed the need to exclude
newborn screenings and confidential research information. 6 As new
categories emerge, a laundry list of exemptions will become difficult and
excessive to create. Therefore, lawmakers need to consider a catch
phrase for new developments.
C. Variance in Activities Prohibited
Aside from the diversity of definitions, states have passed a wide va-
riety of laws to safeguard an individual's genetic information. These
safeguards are likewise diverse. The assumption is that insurers will use
genetic information for discriminatory purposes in underwriting. In or-
der to prevent this, states have enacted several different types of laws.
The prohibitions fall into three distinct categories, with the exception of
a handful of states enacting seemingly arbitrary laws. The three catego-
ries are those that (1) restrict the actual use of genetic information; (2)
prohibit insurers from requiring a genetic test; and (3) prohibit insurers
from making certain considerations.
1. Laws Restricting the Use of Genetic Information
The major concern in using genetic information is that insurers will
use test results to deny an applicant's request for insurance. Twenty
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301(1)(a) (West Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-
2702 (1998).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215(a)(1) (1998); see also H.R. 8, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (Ill. 1997); H.R. 39,75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
63. See S.B. 2018,181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). Scientists and drug companies
are especially concerned that the influx of new laws will restrict their research. See Pear, su-
pra note 7.
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states have determined that an insurer may not deny coverage because
of genetic information." However, several states then go further and
prohibit insurers from limiting coverage or determining rates or premi-
ums based on genetic information.6 Prohibiting coverage limits and
premium increases based on increased risk undermines the theory of in-
surance. Several states expand even further and prohibit insurers from
canceling or refusing to renew policies.6 For most individuals this is a
moot point because federal law requires guaranteed renewability.6 Ar-
guably, the only reasonable public policy restriction on the use of ge-
netic information by insurers is the prohibition on denial of applicants.
2. Laws Prohibiting Requiring a Genetic Test
Many states also prohibit insurers from requiring or requesting a ge-
netic test. The purpose behind these laws is to prohibit insurers from
requiring a genetic test when the results would be used for eligibility
64. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(b)
(West Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.4301(2)(a) (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-
26-7 (West Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.7 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §
27-909 (c) (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-
18-206 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:4 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West
Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215 (1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.49 (Ander-
son 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(3) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2702 (Supp. 1997);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.73 (West Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie Supp.
1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West 1995).
65. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(6)
(West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301
(West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-26-8 (West Supp. 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
213.7 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909(c) (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139
(West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A (1998);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:4 (1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West Supp. 1998);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215(c) (Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.49(B) (Ander-
son 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(3) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2703 (Supp. 1997);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.73 (West Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie Supp.
1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.89(2)(d) (West 1995).
66. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(b) (West Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-
816 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301(2)(a) (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §
27-8-26-5 (West Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.7 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 27-909(c) (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West Supp. 1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. §
17B:30-12 (Supp. 1998); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.49(D) (Anderson 1996); OR. REV.
STAT. § 746.135(3) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2703 (Supp. 1997); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. § 21.73 (West Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie Supp. 1998); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West 1995).
67. See Mark R. Goodman, Recent Developments in the Public Regulation of Insurance
Law, 33 TORT & INS. LJ. 681 (1998).
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purposes." However, many of these states also have laws prohibiting
certain activities, such as canceling, limiting, denying, or determining
rates. 9 After the scientific community has discovered more about cer-
tain genetic traits, it will probably develop methods of treatment. If in-
surers are going to be responsible for payment of any treatment, the in-
surer should have the right to require a genetic test. Typically, the
earlier a disease is caught or manifests itself, the more effective the
treatment. Insurers should be able to evaluate their customers and as-
sist in treatment by requiring genetic tests.
3. Laws Prohibiting Certain Considerations
Six states also have laws that restrict insurers from considering ac-
tions by the insured or applicant. Florida, Louisiana, and Tennessee
prohibit an insurer from considering whether the applicant made a re-
quest for a genetic test.0 Several other states prohibit the insurer from
considering whether the applicant refused or obtained a genetic test.
For example, Kansas law provides that an insurance company may "not
consider in the determination of rates or any other aspect of [coverage
or benefits] whether an individual or a [family member] has obtained a
genetic test or the results of the test.... "71 These laws are premised on
the idea that people would be afraid to get tested if insurers will use the
test results.
4. Irregular Laws
The hasty decision making in state legislatures becomes apparent
when other individual and unique laws are examined. Oregon and
Texas have laws that prohibit an insurer from using favorable genetic
tests as an inducement for coverage.' This type of law is counterintui-
tive in terms of the fear of discrimination. Up until now, states have
been concerned with the inevitability of increased premiums and limited
benefits. However, a favorable test result could reduce rates. Indiana
seemingly embraced this idea because its law allows an insurer to con-
sider the results of a genetic test if the results are voluntarily submitted
68. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10149 (West Supp. 1998).
69. See supra Part III (C)(1).
70. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301(2) (West Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.7
(West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2703 (Supp. 1997).
71. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2259 (Supp. 1997).
72. See OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(2) (1997); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.73 (West Supp.
1998).
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and favorable to the applicant or insured.73 Indiana's law promotes the
interest of the individual in both privacy and business. One might argue,
however, that the insurance company already has one foot in the door.
A few states have recognized the idea that genetic information could
potentially be useful for treatment and diagnosis purposes. Georgia re-
cently enacted a law which provides that "any insurer that receives in-
formation derived from genetic testing may not use the information for
any nontherapeutic purpose."74 Montana also has a more relaxed law in
that it allows an insurer to deny an application or fix rates and terms if
the "applicant's medical condition and history and either claims experi-
ence or actuarial projections establish that substantial differences in
claims are likely to result from the genetic condition .... ,
Two other states have laws that are unique-as well as perplexing.
Alabama prohibits insurers from requiring, "as a condition of insurabil-
ity[,] that a person take a genetic test to determine if the person has a
predisposition for cancer" and from using the "results of a genetic test
which may show the predisposition for cancer to determine insurability
or to otherwise discriminate... .,76 Therefore, an insurer in Alabama
seemingly could use genetic information related to any other disease.
Colorado, on the other hand, is extremely strict on insurers. Colorado's
law provides that an insurer that "receives information derived from ge-
netic testing may not seek, use, or keep the information for any non-
therapeutic purpose or for any underwriting purpose... ."7 This type of
law poses a serious threat to insurers. If an insurer incidentally receives
medical records from an applicant's doctor for underwriting purposes,
the insurer may not even legally keep those records on file. This vast ar-
ray of state regulation illustrates the need for federal guidance on the
issue of genetic information.
IV. FEDERAL ATTEMPTS AT REGULATION
The impetus for federal legislation is the Human Genome Project
and concern about how the information will be used once it is col-
lected.78 However, the data is not even close to being fully collected yet.
73. See IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-26-9 (West Supp. 1998).
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-4 (1996); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(3)
(West Supp. 1998).
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206(4) (1997).
76. 1997 Ala. Acts 97-721.
77. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
78. See Phillip McAffee, House Bill Would Prohibit Genetic Discrimination, WEST's
LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 20,1995, at 563.
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This may be part of the reason that federal legislative proposals have
not been heavily pursued. Another reason may be that the government
is also still pursuing laws dealing with genetic discrimination in employ-
ment. The Healthcare Leadership Council believes that even federal
proposals concerning employment are "too far-reaching" because the
application of genetic information is still largely unknown. 9 A third
reason for the delay is that the government is still evaluating whether
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") carries possible signifi-
cance for genetic discrimination.' °
The federal bills that have been introduced generally have strong
support and stronger motivations. A core of five organizations typically
supports the bills, including the American Cancer Society, the National
Breast Cancer Coalition, the Council for Responsible Genetics, the Na-
tional Action Plan on Breast Cancer, and the National Advisory Council
for Human Genome Research." When introducing the Genetic Privacy
Act of 1995, Senator Hatfield claimed that the purpose was to "establish
some initial limitations... ."2 The Senator urged that insurer discrimi-
nation is "problematic because we are only in the first stages of under-
standing the human genome."83 The converse of this idea is also true. It
is extremely problematic to begin legislating against an idea that is in its
mere infancy. We have not even begun to scrape the surface of the po-
tential use of genetic information.
The bills proposed by the federal legislature have consistently tried
the same approach to limiting discrimination. Typically, they attempt to
prohibit a group health plan from denying, limiting, or canceling a plan
based on genetic information, or the request or receipt of genetic infor-
mation.84 One particular bill introduced in Congress contained four dis-
tinct protections: (1) it prohibited denial or cancellation; (2) it prohib-
ited changing premiums, terms, or conditions of policies; (3) it
prohibited the request or requirement of a genetic test; and (4) it pro-
vided for confidentiality." Another bill, a year later, prohibited insurers
from requiring an applicant or insured to be subjected to questions re-
79. Gore Urges Curbs on Genetic Testing, MARKETLETTER, Feb. 2,1998.
80. See Gostin, supra, note 17.
81. See 141 CONG. REC. H14906 (daily ed. Dec. 14,1995) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).
82. 140 CONG. REC. S17096 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
83. Id.
84. See S. Res. 89,105th Cong. § 9811 (1997); H.R. Res. 306, 105th Cong. § 713 (1997); S.
Res. 1045, 105th Cong. (1997); S. Res. 1694, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996); H.R. 2748, 104th Cong.
(1995).
85. See McAfee, supra note 78, at 563.
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lating to genetic information.86 A bill proposed last year provided that a
health insurer could not impose a rider or establish different premiums
"on the basis of any molecular genetic information about a healthy indi-
vidual."' Overall, the life span of a bill restricting limitations to healthy
individuals has not been very long.
One of the most recent House bills appeared to follow the trend of a
couple of states."' The bill prohibited an insurer from rejecting, denying,
limiting, canceling, refusing to renew, increasing the rates, or otherwise
affecting a policy of insurance.89 This bill also prohibited the use of fa-
vorable genetic tests as an inducement."° Other bills have been overly
broad by prohibiting insurers from seeking, receiving, or maintaining
genetic information.9' This poses the same problem as Colorado's law'
by potentially restricting information that insurers have no control over
receiving. Senator Hatfield emphasized that the strongest point of his
1995 Genetic Privacy Act related to protecting individuals against the
cancellation of coverage.93 However, other insurance laws provide for
guaranteed renewability of coverage, and it should not be a concern re-
lated to genetic privacy.'
V. PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL LAW
Insurance is primarily a state-regulated industry;" however, this
multi-state approach has often left the insurance industry to wrestle with
weak and inconsistent regulations.96 Because genetic privacy is such a
universal concern, federal regulation is entirely appropriate to
strengthen the force of legislation.' Scholars and legal activists alike
have been urging strong federal protection of confidentiality.98 The
Health and Human Services' report on genetic research was accurate in
86. See S. 1898, 104th Cong. § 302 (1996).
87. S. 422, 105th Cong. § 402 (1997).
88. See H.R. 341,105th Cong. § 6 (1997).
89. See idL
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., H.R. 2216,105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West Supp. 1998).
93. See supra note 82.
94. See supra notes 65-67.
95. See ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 37 (brief history of federal and state insurance
law).
96. See id.
97. Even without federal legislation, states should refrain from passing laws without a
sound basis and laws that are in conflict with other state provisions.
98. Genetic Testing Fears, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Jan. 26,1998, at B4.
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"recommend[ing] a federal approach, [because] laws in place in [nine-
teen] states present a 'patchwork' approach that is often narrow in
scope.'
However, recommending strong federal guidance does not mean
that insurers should be totally barred from using genetic information, as
some have argued. A Science magazine writer stated, for example, that
"[m]eaningful protection against genetic discrimination requires that in-
surers be prohibited from using all information about genes, gene prod-
ucts, or inherited characteristics to deny or limit health insurance cover-
age."' ' Genetic screening can just as easily be used for self-serving as
well as discriminatory reasons by individuals. °1' An individual may dis-
cover his predisposition for cancer and decide to purchase health or life
insurance to pay for his medical expenses and provide for his family in
case of death. The American Council of Life Insurance believes that if
the patient has the information, the insurer should also have access. ' 02
"The plea for privacy," Professor Richard Epstein has commented, "is
often a plea for the right to misrepresent one's self to the rest of the
world."' 3
We need to strike the proper balance in order to prevent the onset
of disease, encourage research, and not threaten people with the loss of
insurance. The scientific community believes that as "at-risk popula-
tions are identified, research can be done to determine effective preven-
tion and treatment strategies that will lower the personal, social, and
perhaps the financial costs of disease in the future."'0 4 The trend in in-
surance is toward a total health management perspective and improving
the quality of life. Insurers would potentially use genetic information
for preventative measures in treatment. The other factor to consider is
the vast amount of uncertainty and confusion that still surrounds genetic
information. Genetic information merely shows a predisposition to-
wards the disease; there is no guarantee that the individual will manifest
symptoms. Another item to consider is that insurers will be reluctant to
99. President Clinton Endorses Expansion of Federal Ban on Genetic Underwriting, 1
No. 20 MEALEY'S INS. L. WKLY 7 (July 21,1997).
100. Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent
Need for Reform, SCIENCE, Oct. 20,1995, at 391.
101. See Gollaher, supra note 6.
102. See David Ballingrud, Gene Testing Raises Fears of Insurance Discrimination, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 4,1995, at 14A.
103. Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Re-
sponses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (citation omitted).
104. Hudson, supra note 100.
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pay for the tests if the information is unavailable to them. Until all this
uncertainty begins to clear, genetic privacy should be the norm without
concerns for discrimination. The proper approach is to take the target
off of the private insurance industry and establish baseline federal pro-
tections for privacy. The federal government is funding the Human Ge-
nome Project, and is therefore in the best position to make any determi-
nations about what legislation is proper. Until then, the government can
learn from the states' mistakes and rash judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public is constantly bombarded with the idea that "[u]nless state
and federal laws make genetic discrimination unlawful, insurance com-
panies will continue to abuse biotechnology to insure only the 'geneti-
cally healthy' and accordingly maximize their profits."10 5 However, this
is far from the truth. Recently, Missouri considered a bill concerning
genetic discrimination and the news reported: "At a recent hearing be-
fore the House Insurance Committee, no one testified claiming to have
been dropped from coverage because of results of genetic tests. The
bill's backers know of no case in Missouri where someone has been de-
nied coverage."1  The fact remains that there is a much broader spec-
trum of potential users of genetic information including the following:
mortgage lenders, medical colleges, scholarship donors, business part-
ners, adoption agencies, and politicians. 7
Genetic composition is beyond our control, but it is potentially
treatable. What if the fear behind insurance discrimination laws is mis-
guided? The fear of discrimination may not be the primary deterrent
for avoiding genetic tests. There are other factors such as cost and fear
of knowing the unknown. For insurance companies, evaluating risk is a
part of the business and genetic predisposition is just another piece of
the puzzle.
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